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SUMMARY
Many exploration companies are now focusing on specialty
materials that are associated with so-called ‘green technology’.
These include ‘battery materials’, ‘magnet materials’ and ‘pho-
tovoltaic materials’, and many such commodities are also
broadly labelled as ‘critical materials’ because they are seen as
vital for industrial development, societal needs or national
security. The definitions used for such materials are not always
consistent among jurisdictions or across industry, and this
paper attempts to clarify the criteria and address some com-
mon misconceptions. The distinction between major minerals
(e.g. base metals) and ‘specialty materials’ (i.e. those mined or
produced in much smaller amounts) is particularly important. 
The markets for many specialty materials are growing faster
than those for traditional ferrous, precious and base metals and
they are often portrayed as excellent long-term investment
opportunities. However, the small market bases for specialty
materials and considerable uncertainty around growth projec-
tions (especially related to material substitutions and rapid
technological change) need to be taken into consideration for
objective assessment of  the development potential of  any pro-
posed project, establishment of  new supply chains by major
corporations, and responsible decision-making (mineral poli-
cy) by government. In the short-term, projects aimed at spe-
cialty materials (materials with a small market base) cannot
benefit from economy of  scale, and their development hinges
on commercially proven metallurgical processes, unless they
are supported by governments or end-users. 
Several specialty metals (e.g. germanium, indium, cadmium,
and cobalt) are commonly obtained as by-products of  base
metal extraction. In such cases, systematic testing of  base
metal ores for their specialty metal content may justify the
addition of  relevant recovery circuits to existing smelters. If
positive results are obtained, the need for targeting new
sources of  such specialty metals as primary exploration targets
may be reduced or eliminated. 
Where market conditions permit and concerns about the
future availability of  materials seem reliable, grass-roots explo-
ration for specialty materials is warranted, and pre-competitive
government involvement may be justified to promote such
development efforts. 
RÉSUMÉ
De nombreuses sociétés d’exploration se concentrent désor-
mais sur les matériaux spécialisés associés à ce que l’on appelle
la « technologie verte ». Ceux-ci incluent les « matériaux pour
batterie », les « matériaux magnétiques » et les « matériaux pho-
tovoltaïques », et de nombreux produits de ce type sont aussi
largement étiquetés comme « matériaux critiques » car ils sont
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considérés comme vitaux pour le développement industriel, les
besoins sociétaux ou la sécurité nationale. Les définitions util-
isées pour ces matériaux ne sont pas toujours cohérentes entre
les juridictions ou dans l’industrie, et ce document tente de
clarifier les critères et de répondre à certaines idées fausses
courantes. La distinction entre les principaux minéraux (par
exemple les métaux de base) et les « matériaux spécialisés »
(c’est-à-dire ceux extraits ou produits en quantités beaucoup
plus faibles) est particulièrement importante.
Les marchés de nombreux matériaux spécialisés croissent
plus rapidement que ceux des métaux ferreux, précieux et de
base traditionnels et ils sont souvent présentés comme d’excel-
lentes opportunités d’investissement à long terme. Cependant,
le marché restreint des matériaux spécialisés et l’incertitude
considérable entourant les projections de croissance (en parti-
culier liées aux substitutions de matériaux et aux changements
technologiques rapides) doivent être prises en considération
pour une évaluation objective du potentiel de développement
de tout projet proposé, l’établissement de nouvelles chaînes
d’approvisionnement par les grandes entreprises et une prise
de décisions responsable par le gouvernement (politique
minière). À court terme, les projets visant des matériaux spé-
cialisés (matériaux ayant un marché restreint) ne peuvent pas
bénéficier d’économies d’échelle et leur développement repose
sur des procédés métallurgiques commercialement éprouvés, à
moins qu’ils ne soient soutenus par les gouvernements ou les
utilisateurs finaux.
Plusieurs métaux spécialisés (par exemple le germanium,
l’indium, le cadmium et le cobalt) sont couramment obtenus
comme sous-produits de l’extraction des métaux de base. Dans
de tels cas, l’analyse systématique des minerais de métaux de
base pour leur teneur en métaux spécialisés peut justifier l’ajout
de circuits de récupération adéquats aux fonderies existantes.
Si des résultats positifs sont obtenus, la nécessité de cibler de
nouvelles sources de ces métaux spécialisés en tant que cibles
d’exploration primaires peut être réduite ou éliminée.
Lorsque les conditions du marché le permettent et que les
craintes quant à la disponibilité future des matériaux semblent
fiables, l’exploration primaire de matériaux spécialisés est justi-
fiée, et la participation préconcurrentielle du gouvernement
peut être justifiée pour promouvoir de tels efforts de
développement.
Traduit par la Traductrice
INTRODUCTION
The Context of Critical Materials
Future growth in ‘green technologies’ is largely dependent on
the anticipated increase in the use of  electric vehicles, and the
development of  renewable energy operations and energy stor-
age capacities in electricity grids. These visions of  a ‘green
energy future’ are indicated in recent studies by the World
Bank Group (2017), Hund et al. (2020), the European Com-
mission (2018, 2020), and Küpper et al. (2018). Green tech-
nologies are increasingly dependent on reliable supply chains
of  so-called ‘battery’, ‘magnet’, and ‘photovoltaic’ raw materi-
als. Many of  these raw materials are part of  a broader category
of  materials commonly labelled as ‘critical’, although the crite-
ria for this label are not always rigorous (see below). Efforts by
major corporations and governments are underway to secure
adequate supplies of  several ‘critical’ raw materials, such as
lithium (Li), cobalt (Co), nickel (Ni), graphite, vanadium (V),
and manganese (Mn) to meet future demands. At the same
time, there is growing public pressure to assess supply chains
for such materials in terms of  their human and/or environ-
mental impacts, and to ensure that they meet ethical expecta-
tions held by western industrialized countries. The U.S., Japan,
and many European countries have historically relied on mate-
rials sourced from Africa, China, South America, or other
countries that have less stringent environmental regulations
and lower production costs compared to those of  western
industrialized nations (European Commission 2017, 2020;
World Bank 2017; U.S. Department of  the Interior 2018;
Hund et al. 2020; Fortier et al. 2020). This is one reason why
traditional suppliers of  raw materials such as Canada and Aus-
tralia were finding it hard to compete with African, Chinese,
and South American sources producing some of  these materi-
als. 
The critical materials concept, which western countries
relied upon during past military conflicts, was viewed as redun-
dant by some western military powers after World War II and
the Cold War, and their stockpiles of  critical materials were
eliminated or reduced. The rush for ‘magnet’ materials was
reignited around 2010 by disruptions and insecurities around
the availability of  rare earth elements (REE), following the real
or perceived threats by China to reduce or cut its REE exports
to western-style industrialized countries as a bargaining strate-
gy in geopolitical and economic negotiations (e.g. Simandl
2014; Goodenough et al. 2018). At that time, China controlled
more than 95% of  global REE production. Some REE are
essential for the manufacturing of  high-performance magnets
used in wind turbines and electric-car drive trains, and they are
widely used in portable computing and communication equip-
ment (e.g. laptops, tablets, smart phones, etc.). These technolo-
gies are all considered essential for the economies and national
security of  developed countries, for efforts to reduce green-
house gas emissions, and for the transition to low-carbon soci-
eties (European Commission 2017, 2020; World Bank 2017;
Brainard et al. 2018; U.S. Department of  the Interior 2018;
Fortier et al. 2020; Hund et al. 2020). The rush to identify new
REE resources quickly spilled over to other materials, includ-
ing ‘battery’ and ‘photovoltaic’ materials, and a wide selection
of  so-called ‘critical materials’ are now attracting unprecedent-
ed exploration interest. The efforts to rely on responsible
sourcing and the ongoing global coronavirus pandemic have
not diminished this activity, because in many respects, they
have highlighted the vulnerability of  international supply
chains for commodities of  all types.
What Are Critical and Specialty Materials?
Numerous companies now focus and explore for materials
that are deemed ‘critical’ by major industrialized nations or
nation blocs (European Commission 2017, 2020; U.S. Depart-
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ment of  the Interior 2018; Fortier et al. 2020). A full list of
these materials is provided in Table 1, which shows that desig-
nations vary among jurisdictions. In recent years, emphasis has
shifted towards critical materials used in batteries and perma-
nent magnets needed by electric vehicles, for electrical genera-
tion and for energy storage associated with alternative (renew-
able) sources (e.g. solar and wind energy). Most of  these so-
called ‘battery’, ‘magnet’, and ‘photovoltaic’ materials are des-
ignated as critical (Table 1), but many are also termed ‘specialty
materials’ because their global production does not exceed
200,000 tonnes per year. 
It is also important to remember that the usage of  a given
material in battery, magnet, or photovoltaic applications
accounts for only a portion of  its global annual production. For
example, global natural graphite production for 2020 was
reported at 1.1 million metric tonnes (Olson 2021), but only
some of  this is used in battery applications. Natural graphite is
also used for applications such as refractory bricks, crucibles
and crucible linings, brake linings, lubricants, and in electric arc
furnaces. Similarly, most of  the 86,000 metric tonnes of  vana-
dium produced was used as an alloying agent in iron and steel-
making (Polyak 2021), and almost all the 18.5 million tonnes of
manganese produced was used in the steel industry. Other uses
of  manganese include fertilizers, animal feed, and as a brick
colourant, so its actual consumption for battery applications is
a trivial part of  the global production (Schnebele 2021). The
low ratio between total global reserves for a given material and
its yearly global production has been used for many years as a
general indicator of  potential future short-term resource
shortages and related price hike forecasts, and as justification
for increasing exploration efforts and expenses. This ratio is
provided in Table 2. In interpreting data in this way, it is impor-
tant to remember that ongoing exploration and mining activi-
ties continually define new reserves and upgrade resources to
reserves, so these apparent ‘resource lifetimes’ are changing
continuously. In a 1999 article for the ‘Economist’ (Anony-
mous 1999), Don Huberts (the head of  Hydrogen division of
Royal Dutch Shell) is quoted: “The stone age did not end because the
world ran out of  stones, and the oil age will not end because we run out
of  oil.” His prophecy is becoming a reality, and the same will
probably apply to materials that we currently consider as
essential for a green economy.
The first purpose of  this paper is to define and describe the
terms ‘critical’, ‘specialty’, ‘battery’, ‘magnet’, and ‘photovolta-
ic’ materials as used today. We then highlight the importance
of  understanding the current market bases, various market
projections, and the possible influences of  technological
change on future demand. It is especially important to separate
hard data (including the current market base) from market pro-
jections subject to uncertainties. Both should be considered
differently from documents containing more speculative or
potentially inflated expectations regarding the commercializa-
tion of  early laboratory research, non-technical documents
emphasizing the potential future importance of  a given mate-
rial, and promotional documents aiming to attract speculative
investment. We also stress the need to consider the effects of
potential material substitutions and future technological devel-
opments on market projections of  all types. A full appreciation
of  all these concepts is essential for the selection of  explo-
ration targets, the design of  exploration programs, and the
timing of  mineral development projects or property acquisi-
tions. These issues are important beyond the corporate world,
as they should also influence responsible government-level
decision making.
Definitions of key terms
Some key terms used in this paper require definition because
they also have wider common usage that is less restrictive. Our
definitions are provided below:
Material: the element, constituent, or substance (solid,
liquid, or gas) of  which something is composed of, or
can be made of  (may be organic, mineral, metal, etc.).
Consequently, ‘material’ is a more general term than
‘mineral’ or ‘metal’ (see below).
Mineral: a solid, homogeneous crystalline chemical ele-
ment or compound that results from the inorganic
processes of  nature (e.g. quartz, feldspar, fluorite, native
gold, etc.). This term also includes industrial minerals. 
Industrial Mineral: a geological material, which is mined
for its commercial value, but is not used for its energetic
value or as a metal ore. Industrial minerals are valued
for their physical and/or chemical properties (e.g.
graphite, fluorite, barite). This term also includes
‘industrial rocks’ (e.g. marble, quartzite, and phosphate
rock).
Metal: any of  various opaque, fusible, ductile, and typi-
cally lustrous substances that is a good conductor of
electricity and heat, forms cations by loss of  electrons,
and yields basic oxides and hydroxides (e.g. Cu, PGE,
Au). For the purposes of  this paper, it also includes
some elements that are technically labelled as semi-met-
als (metalloids) by chemists (e.g. silicon, boron, germa-
nium, and arsenic). For example, silicon has most of  the
metallic properties, aside from ductility; however, the
term ‘silicon metal’ is used in many publications. 
        
Some materials (e.g. magnesite) have dual allegiance. Mag-
nesite can be considered as an industrial mineral if  it is used in
the production of  Mg-bearing compounds valued for their
physical and chemical properties. However, it is considered a
metal ore when it is used as a raw material for the production
of  Mg metal.
MAJOR COMMODITIES AND SPECIALTY MATERIALS:
IMPLICATIONS OF CONTRASTING MARKET SIZES 
Example of Major Commodities: Base and Precious
Metals
Exploration companies typically target major commodities
such as ferrous metals (e.g. Fe and Mn), precious metals (e.g.
Au and Ag), and base metals (e.g. Al, Pb, Ni, and Zn). These
major commodities have well-established global market bases
with relatively predictable growth rates related to global eco-
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nomic cycles. Production of  major commodities is not severely
geographically restricted and overall, their markets are subject
to the law of  supply and demand. The prices of  these major
commodities fluctuate, but there are always markets for the
production of  most of  them, with ‘spot prices’ available
through metal exchange(s).
For these major commodity materials, assuming that tech-
nical aspects (e.g. geological, geotechnical, mineralogical, met-
allurgical factors) are favourable, and that societal and eco-
nomic conditions permit, a given deposit can generally be
developed. It is also normally the case that if  we consider two
hypothetical and technically identical deposits having the same
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Table 1. ‘Critical’, ‘specialty’, ‘battery’, ‘magnet’, and ‘photovoltaic’ materials. A material is designated as a ‘specialty’ material if  its
global production is less than 200,000 tonnes per year (global production estimates are provided in Table 2). A material is classified
as a ‘U.S. Critical Material’ if  it was included in the U.S. Department of  the Interior (2018) Critical Material List. Similarly, a material
is classified as ‘EU Critical Material’ if  included in the European Commission (2020) Critical Materials List. Materials are referred
to as ‘battery’, ‘magnet’, and ‘photovoltaic’ based on prevalent use in trade journals, company reports, and government publica-
tions (by consumers, exploration companies, banks, general public, and governments). Note that individual platinum group ele-
ments (PGE) and rare earth elements (REE) are not listed individually.
Material Specialty U.S. Critical EU Critical Battery Photovoltaic Magnet
Material Material Material Material Material Material
Sb x x x
As x x
Barite x x
Bauxite (Al) x x
Be x x x




Co x x x x x
Coking coal x
Fluorspar x x
Ga x x x x
Ge x x x x
Graphite (natural) x x x
Hf x x x
He x x
In x x x x
Li x x x x
Mg x x
Mn x x
Nb x x x
Phosphate rock x
P x
Platinum Group Elements (PGE) x x x
Potash x
Rare Earth Elements (REE) x x x x
Rhenium (Re) x x
Rb x x
Sc x x x
Silicon x x
Sr x x
Ta x x x
Te x x x
Sn x
Ti x x
W x x x
U x
V x x x x
Zr x x
ore-grade, the deposit having greater tonnage is more likely to
be developed than the smaller deposit. This is because econo-
my of  scale leads to cost efficiency, as the cost per unit of  out-
put generally decreases with the increasing scale and lifespan of
the operation. 
The positive effects of  the economy of  scale for many
industrial commodities with well-established market bases (e.g.
Cu and Fe) are demonstrated by currently profitable high-ton-
nage, low-grade deposits that are exploited at high production
rates. 
An example of  a mining operation benefiting from econo-
my of  scale is the Highland Valley porphyry copper–molybde-
num mine in British Columbia, with proven and probable
reserves of  484 Mt at 0.31% Cu and 0.007% Mo, respectively.
Resource estimates are as follows; measured: 552.3 million
tonnes at 0.29% Cu and 0.008% Mo; indicated: 861.6 million
tonnes at 0.23% Cu and 0.009% Mo, and inferred: 270.5 mil-
lion tonnes at 0.20% Cu and 0.008% Mo. The forecasted 2020
production from Highland Valley was 120,000–125,000 tonnes
of  Cu, and 1500–1800 tonnes of  Mo (Clarke et al. 2021). The
Highland Valley operation will be used in the next section as a
benchmark in discussion of  importance of  the market base
constraint on development of  specialty metal deposits.
Examples of Specialty Materials
In contrast to the major commodities and construction mate-
rials, many other materials, including some perceived as ‘criti-
cal,’ are produced in much smaller quantities. Materials that
have global production below 200,000 tonnes/year are com-
monly referred to as ‘specialty’ materials (Tables 1 and 2). 
The size of  the global market for a typical specialty materi-
al, in terms of  tonnage, is less than the annual Cu production
of  two deposits comparable in size to the Highland Valley
mine summarized above. Consequently, mining operations
supplying specialty materials do not benefit from economy of
scale in the manner that large deposits of  major commodities
enjoy. An example is tantalum (Ta; global production of  1700
tonnes; Table 2), for which some medium-sized operations
may be mechanized, whereas smaller and higher-grade
deposits, especially if  located in developing countries, are arti-
sanal enterprises, worked by hand (Mackay and Simandl 2014;
Simandl et al. 2018). Tantalum is a material of  great impor-
tance in high-technology applications, but its small market
base and current prices provide limited incentive for the devel-
opment of  new high tonnage, low-grade deposits that would
have to rely on the economy of  scale to be profitable. Howev-
er, there are exceptions, such as pegmatite mining operations
in Australia where Ta is co-produced with Li, and where com-
panies are vertically integrated or have long-term contracts for
their output. 
The REE provide another example. In the medium- and
long-term, there is high expected market growth for some of
the REE, especially for Nd and Dy, and the market conditions
appear very promising. However, let us put this into the con-
text of  the current market situation. If  the law of  supply and
demand applies and no punitive import tariffs or export
restrictions exist, one or two hypothetical, newly developed
deposits each producing 50,000 tonnes/year of  rare earth
oxides (REO) would result in a short-term market oversupply.
This is because the world REO demand, including yttrium (Y),
was estimated at only 250,000 tonnes in 2020 (Gambogi 2021a,
b). It is not surprising that most of  the REE deposits that were
investigated as potential non-Chinese sources of  REE in the
early 2000s never made it to the production stage. The price of
a specialty material can be severely impacted by oversupply
from a single potential new source. 
In contrast, a hypothetical new Cu mine equivalent to the
Highland Valley example would represent only a small fraction
(approximately 0.6%) of  the global 2020 Cu production, esti-
mated at 20 million metric tonnes (Flanagan 2021; Table 2).
The impact of  a new Cu mine on the global supply of  Cu
would be minimal, and no short-term oversupply of  Cu would
emerge. 
Examples of  specialty metals that are considered critical by
the U.S. Department of  the Interior (Fortier et al. 2020) and
the European Commission (2020) include both Ta (used in
capacitors), and certain REE, mainly Nd and Dy (used in high-
intensity permanent magnets). Other critical specialty materials
include minor alloying agents for steel alloys (e.g. Nb, Ta, W,
and Be), and other metal alloys (e.g. Sc). 
To summarize, we can say that under normal (free market)
conditions, projects targeting specialty materials cannot be
assessed in the same way as those targeting major commodi-
ties. At least in the short-term, because of  the small market
bases, potential specialty material producers cannot compen-
sate for lower grades by mining and processing larger tonnages
of  ore (i.e. relying on economies of  scale) unless the specialty
material is a by-product or a co-product of  another commod-
ity. However, if  the specialty material is also considered critical,
as discussed in the next section, free market conditions may
not apply, because in some cases financial incentives may be
provided by governments or major corporations.
CRITICAL MATERIALS
Concepts and Definitions
The concept of  critical materials is familiar to most people in
the resource sector, and there are several examples and reviews
of  how materials are assessed and ranked in terms of  criticality
(e.g. U.S. Department of  Defense 2013; European Commis-
sion 2014, 2017; Simandl et al. 2015; Hayes and McCullough
2018). 
Raw materials are essential to the global economy and soci-
ety. Availability of  some materials at competitive prices is now
important for the high technology industry and the develop-
ment of  clean emission-free energy. During World War II and
the subsequent Cold War, most western countries identified
critical materials and maintained stockpiles of  them. ‘Critical
material lists’ were considered to be obsolete following the dis-
integration of  the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, and stock-
piles were reduced. However, since the early 2010s, relation-
ships between the United States and other western countries
with China and Russia have deteriorated, so many western
industrialized countries re-established lists of  materials
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deemed as critical for economic, environmental, or national
security reasons.
Since 2010, critical materials lists of  western industrialized
countries have been updated and expanded. For example, the
2018 list commissioned by the U.S. Department of  the Interior
contains 35 materials (Table 1). The lists of  critical materials
become substantially longer if  the PGE and REE are consid-
ered as discrete chemical elements, rather than as groups of
elements that commonly occur together. Depending on the
interests of  the organization that commissions the study (e.g.
European Commission, U.S. Departments of  Defense and of
the Interior and Energy; see reference list for sources), the list
of  critical materials will vary significantly (Simandl et al. 2015;
Hayes and McCullough 2018; see Tables 1 and 2).
The methods used to establish critical materials lists also
vary (Simandl at al. 2015) and are not always exclusively based
on usage and demand. The methodology used in several well-
known criticality studies was compared by Simandl et al. (2015)
and thirty-two criticality studies were discussed and summa-
rized by Hayes and McCullough (2018). 
Figure 1 demonstrates the principle behind a traditional
criticality study, as applied by the European Commission
(2014). The vertical axis represents the increasing risk of  sup-
ply disruption, and the horizontal axis represents the increas-
ing economic importance of  a given material. The vertical and
horizontal dotted lines represent acceptable ‘economic’ and
‘supply risk’ thresholds. For simplicity, we selected two indus-
trial minerals (barite and graphite), one metal (Cu), and one
construction material (aggregate). Barite exceeded the supply
risk threshold of  the study, but its economic importance was
low. Copper and aggregate exceeded the economic threshold
but were considered at low risk of  supply disruption. Howev-
er, natural graphite exceeded both thresholds and is thus
defined as a critical material. The European Commission’s crit-
ical material study emphasized the importance of  materials to
their economy, but other studies may employ different criteria.
For example, the horizontal axis could represent importance to
national security or other specific policy objectives. 
Several nations that are major exporters of  raw materials
have produced their own critical materials lists, which may not
always follow the reasoning outlined above, and may reflect
internal or regional political pressures. These lists commonly
combine the EU and U.S. critical material lists, which reflects
the desire to export to the EU and/or the U.S., and to support
development of  their own non-critical resources. For example,
on March 11, 2021, Canada released its own list, which
includes 31 materials (Government of  Canada 2021). This list
of  31 materials includes Cu, which is excluded from U.S. and
EU critical material lists, and also includes Nb, U and potash.
Canada is itself  a major producer of  these four commodities,
so it is not vulnerable to high supply risks for any of  these
materials. There is nothing legally wrong with the creation of
such ‘expanded criticality lists’, but the original meaning of  the
term ‘critical’ is lost or distorted. The inclusion of  Nb, Cu, U,
and potash simply reflects the importance of  these commodi-
ties to Canada’s resource-based economy and Canada’s desire
to supply its trading partners and allies. 
Any critical mineral list that lacks description of  the
methodology on which it is based should be examined closely
to avoid misinterpretation, because some critical mineral list
entries may be motivated more by domestic efforts to prefer-
entially support mineral production than by true risk of  supply
disruption. 
To reduce the supply risk, some governments are encour-
aging the development of  domestic critical material-bearing
deposits and related supply chains via financial or other incen-
tives. This approach may result in the development of  deposits
that would not otherwise be developed in a free trade environ-
ment. Governments in industrialized countries may also miti-
gate the level of  supply risk by expanding strategic stockpiles
of  critical materials to limit the impact of  potential supply dis-
ruptions. This would represent a shorter-term solution but
might in some cases be more convenient and cheaper than
encouraging development of  a domestic supply. 
Resources, Reserves and Supply Chains
The concept of  a ‘circular economy’ (defined as a regenerative
approach benefiting industries, society, and the environment
through ethical mining and recycling) was recently embraced
by most industrialized nations and major corporations (e.g.
Nassar 2017; Merli et al. 2018). It is expected to influence the
classification of  critical materials by improving or fortifying
existing supply chains. Industry, investors, and the general pub-
lic are acutely aware that potential shortages in critical materi-
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Figure 1. Criticality concept. The vertical axis represents the increasing risk of  sup-
ply disruption and the horizontal axis represents the increasing economic impor-
tance of  a given material. The vertical and horizontal dotted lines represent accept-
able ‘economic’ and ‘supply risk’ thresholds. For simplicity, and to highlight the ver-
satility of  this approach, we selected two industrial minerals (barite and graphite),
one metal (copper), and one construction material (aggregate). Barite exceeded the
supply risk threshold of  the European Commission (2014) critical material study;
however, its economic importance was low. Copper and construction aggregate
exceeded the economic threshold but were considered at low risk of  supply disrup-
tion. Only natural graphite exceeded both thresholds and plotted in the critical
materials field. The horizontal axis of  the 2014 European Commission’s critical
material study represented importance to the economy.
als may materialize in the short to medium terms. However,
they seldom realize that the supply chain beginning with an
exploration project and leading to end-use of  any material (Fig.
2) is complex and not easy to quantify. The supply chain
involves exploration, development, mining, processing, con-
centration, refining, and end-product manufacturing. It
extends beyond the production period as end-of-chain activi-
ties (by-product recovery, recycling, and mine rehabilitation)
must now also be considered for any project. 
If  all critical material projects currently in the exploration
and development stages targeting materials belonging simulta-
neously to the critical and specialty material categories were
brought to production as scheduled, there would be a short-
term oversupply, which would inevitably affect prices. The
problem that most exploration companies and investors strug-
gle with is how to screen and rank critical material projects
according to their true merit. 
In general, after the discovery of  a major commodity
deposit, the development of  mining infrastructure, milling
facilities and concentration circuits is routine and rarely techni-
cally insurmountable. However, for many critical materials (e.g.
REE, graphite, Ta, Co, and Li) varied and complex mineralogy
can present metallurgical challenges in processing, which can
impede the development of  a deposit (Fig. 2). This is especially
problematic if  the critical material also belongs to the specialty
materials category, because the research investment and
financing of  new or complex extraction circuits is not justified
for such a small market base.
If  we consider the simple ratio of  global reserves to yearly
commodity production (lifetime of  reserves; Table 2), short-
ages of  critical materials appear unlikely. This ratio is only an
indicator of  order of  magnitude, but Table 2 shows that at the
2020 production rates, the present global reserves (sensu
USGS) for most critical materials would last from 12 to more
than 100 years. Global reserves will also grow with continued
exploration to replace mined-out deposits and upgrade sube-
conomic resources to reserves. The most likely causes of  crit-
ical materials shortages would be weaknesses (e.g. bottlenecks)
in other links of  the supply chain (Fig. 2), time lags in reaching
production, or the unwillingness of  consumers to accept high-
er prices. The resistance of  consumers to the use of  materials
sourced from jurisdictions or operations with questionable
environmental or human rights records may also become more
important in the 21st century. 
BATTERY MATERIALS
Transportation Applications
With recent positive forecasts for electric vehicle market
growth, the term ‘battery materials’ has emerged as a strong
promotional label in the exploration industry. The term gener-
ally refers to Li, Co, Mn, V, Ni, and graphite. It disregards sev-
eral materials used in lead–acid, nickel–cadmium (NiCd), nick-
el–metal hydride (NiMH), and other older battery technolo-
gies. The term also disregards materials used in batteries that
are currently in research development, and/or were recently
introduced. Examples of  excluded materials are Pb, Cd, sul-
phuric acid and certain REE (mainly La, Ce, and Y), which
may account for 4 to 18 wt.% of  NiMH batteries (Lin et al.
2016). The 2020 global production of  these materials is pro-
vided in Table 2. 
Battery technologies are rapidly evolving, but the current
emphasis in transportation-related applications is on lithium-
ion batteries. A typical modern Li-ion battery consists of  an
anode, a cathode, an electrolyte, a polymer separator, Cu and
Al current collectors, and a casing. The anode electrode con-
sists mainly of  graphite and/or other carbon-based materials.
The most common type of  cathode electrode belongs to a ‘lay-
ered category’ of  LiMO2, where M consists of  a combination
of  Co, Ni, Al, and/or Mn. ‘Non-layered categories’ of  cath-
odes (e.g. lithium iron phosphate, LiFePO4, also referred to as
LFP) are less common. LFP-type batteries were used mainly in
China for bus propulsion, grid stabilization, and in some elec-
tric vehicles. Until recently, it was believed that LFP batteries
would be replaced by batteries relying on layered cathodes,
mainly nickel–manganese–cobalt (NMC) and nickel–cobalt–
aluminum oxide (NCA) types that possess higher energy den-
sities (e.g. Olivetti et al. 2017). A high energy density battery is
favoured in transportation applications because it provides a
longer travel range for the electric vehicle between two consec-
utive charges for the same weight of  battery. Surprisingly, since
October 2020, lower energy density LFP batteries are finding
their way into Tesla Model 3 vehicles produced in China and
into lower-cost electric vehicles produced elsewhere. Research
and development objectives specific to Li-ion batteries for the
automotive industry are summarized in Figure 3. This figure,
modified from Bresser et al. (2018), combines views of  repre-
sentatives from China, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. who par-
ticipated in the Advanced Lithium Batteries for Automobile
Applications 10 Conference held in Chicago, U.S. in 2017. It is
essentially a survey summary and it provides a comprehensive
overview of  the research and development strategies in several
industrialized countries. The details vary by jurisdiction, but
the long-term objectives are similar, i.e. manufacturers aspire
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Figure 2. The supply chain from deposit exploration to manufacturing of  the end-
product and its use. The orange boxes are particularly relevant to this paper and for
the early technical ranking of  the deposit according to their development potential.
In the early stages, only the general market base and growth projections, conceptual
and early exploration data, and preliminary metallurgical/refining (geometallurgical)
information are available. 
to reach the post-Li-ion battery era through the commercial-
ization of  new battery chemistries. During this process they
wish to increase the safety and energy density of  batteries and
reduce the use of  costly cobalt. Inevitably, such successes
would change the material requirements for the industry.
Substitutions are being routinely explored to reduce the use
of  high-cost raw materials in batteries (Leader et al. 2019), and
especially those listed on EU and U.S. critical material lists.
These efforts aim to protect industrial end-users against the
impact of  supply disruptions and keep the prices of  batteries
as low as possible without sacrificing quality or efficiency. The
requirements for Li, Co, Ni, Mn, and C materials to produce
lithium–cobalt oxide (LiCoO2; LCO), lithium–nickel–cobalt–
aluminum oxide (LiNi0.8Co0.15Al0.05; NCA), and nickel–man-
ganese–cobalt oxide (NMC) battery cathodes are listed in
Table 3, in units that reflect their energy density (kg of  material
per kilowatt-hour). The lower requirement for Co in NCA and
NMC cathode types is quite evident, as is the implied sensitiv-
ity of  different types to changes in the prices of  individual bat-
tery materials. Conversely, the variety in compositional propor-
tions allows some flexibility of  cathode choice, depending on
commodity prices.
As an example, the direct impact of  a hypothetical 100%
increase in the price of  Li, Co, Mn, and Ni on the overall cost
of  Li-ion batteries is shown in Figure 4. In the case of  Mn,
doubling the price has a limited impact, regardless of  the bat-
tery type. In the case of  Ni, the impact would be low to mod-
erate for NCA and NMC 811 types. On the other hand, Co
price increases would be severe for LCO and NMC 111 types
but would not affect lithium–manganese oxide (LiMn2O4,
LMO) or LFP systems. Lithium price increases would have the
most significant effect on LFP and LMO batteries but would
affect all types to some extent (Fig. 4). 
Nevertheless, the cost of  raw materials is only one of  many
factors that need to be considered in this sector. For example,
NMC 811 batteries show great promise in efforts to increase
the driving range of  electric vehicles and reduce the use of  Co.
However, technical problems and especially safety concerns
around thermal runaway (leading to fires) have impeded the
penetration of  NMC 811 batteries into North American and
European markets. Adamas Intelligence estimated that
between January and September 2019, the market share of
new passenger electric vehicles equipped with NMC 811 bat-
teries increased from less than 1% to 18% in China but
reached only 7% globally (Green Car Congress 2019).
In theory, solid-state batteries will be less expensive, will
benefit from higher energy densities, and will provide higher
safety than ‘traditional’ liquid electrolyte-based batteries cur-
rently used in plug-in electric vehicles. However, the potential
impact of  specific future battery chemistries for electric vehi-
cles (Fig. 3) is difficult to evaluate because many of  these are
in the early research stage and have yet to demonstrate com-
mercial viability. Expectations of  usage remain speculative, and
some predictions may be overly optimistic (Sapunkov et al.
2015; Walker 2018). 
Energy Storage Applications
Stationary energy storage systems are required to maintain the
stability of  the electric power grids during transient peak
demands and to accommodate the intermittent nature of
renewable energy generating power systems (e.g. wind and
solar). They are also important for backup power generation in
a carbon-neutral future. The requirements for these uses are
different from those that apply to transportation applications
(Guney and Tepe 2017; Mendoza-Vizcaino et al. 2019). Low
energy density is not a major issue for stationary energy stor-
age systems, but safety, reliability and durability are important
(Chediak 2018). Although there is a perception that Li-ion bat-
teries will be more important in transportation rather than in
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Figure 3. Summary of  research and development objectives specific to batteries for
the automotive industry; covering anode, electrolyte and cathode materials. The
anticipated progression in anode materials (black) leads from graphite to lithium in
the long term. Similarly, in terms of  electrolyte progression (green), the expected
path will lead from liquid organic electrolytes to solid polymer/inorganic elec-
trolytes. The expected cathode evolution trend (purple) leads from current lithium–
iron–phosphate (LiFePO4; i.e. LFP) and NMC to sulphur (orange) in the long term.
Post-lithium–ion battery era shown in blue will be dominated by metal–sulphur and
metal–air batteries. The proportions of  metals, in respective order, are indicated
numbers in parenthesis. NMC = nickel–manganese–cobalt (for example, NMC 111
has Ni–Mn–Co in ratios of  1:1:1). NCA = nickel–cobalt–aluminum (Ni–Co–Al)
oxide. This figure is based on selected presentations from the annual International
Conference on Advanced Lithium Batteries for Automotive Applications held in
Chicago in October 2017 and is modified from Bresser et al. (2018).
Table 3. The main materials required for production of  five
prototypical cathodes used in Li-ion batteries in kg/kWh
(Olivetti et al. 2017). LCO = lithium–cobalt oxide; NCA =
lithium–nickel–aluminum oxide; NMC = lithium–nickel–
manganese–cobalt oxide (where numbers following ‘NMC’
designation represent Ni:Mn:Co ratios on a mole fraction
basis; for example, NMC 622 has a 6:2:2 Ni:Mn:Co ratio).
Li Co Ni Mn C
LCO 0.113 0.959 0 0 ~1.2
NCA 0.112 0.143 0.759 0
NMC 111 0.139 0.394 0.392 0.367
NMC 622 0.126 0.214 0.641 0.200
NMC 811 0.11 0.094 0.750 0.088
energy storage, this may not be the case. Bloomberg’s predic-
tions suggest that by 2030 the U.S. energy power grid storage
capacity will approach 80 GWh (Fig. 5) and that Li-ion batter-
ies will play a major role in this achievement (Chediak 2018). 
Examples of  non-Li energy-storage systems that already
have reached the market or have the potential to do so include
vanadium redox flow (VRFB), lead–acid, nickel–cadmium
(NiCd), nickel–metal hydride (NiMH) types, and high-temper-
ature batteries such as sodium–sulphur (NaS) and sodium–
nickel–chloride (NaNiCl) types (Luo et al. 2015). Vanadium
redox flow batteries appear particularly promising, but require
an ion exchange membrane made from Nafion, which is an
expensive product from DuPont (Vanýsek and Novák 2017). 
In recent years, VRFBs have been considered as front-run-
ners in grid-scale energy storage and to be on the verge of
commercialization (Sánchez-Díez et al. 2021). However, a life-
time cost analysis of  nine electricity storage technologies in
twelve different system applications suggests that this is far
from certain (Schmidt et al. 2019). Large-scale repurposing of
used batteries from electric vehicles or traditional batteries dis-
placed by solid-state batteries in other sectors could represent
alternatives to VRFB deployment (Miao et al. 2019). Batteries
operating at temperatures around 300°C, such as sodium–sul-
phur (NaS) and sodium–nickel–chloride (NaNiCl) are effective
for energy storage, but the need to maintain a high tempera-
ture and related safety concerns currently present obstacles to
commercialization. 
The U.S. Department of  Energy’s Global Energy Storage
Database (Sandia National Laboratories 2021) currently con-
tains 1697 energy storage projects (proposed, under construc-
tion, operational or decommissioned). Battery technologies
included as operational or future operations in this database
include Li-ion (e.g. lithium iron phosphate, lithium titanate,
lithium manganese dioxide, lithium nickel cobalt aluminum
oxide), Na-ion batteries (e.g. sodium nickel chloride), redox
flow batteries (e.g. vanadium), hybrid flow batteries (e.g. zinc
bromine), and Ni-ion batteries (e.g. nickel iron, nickel metal
hydride, nickel cadmium). Consequently, many materials that
are currently not considered to belong to the ‘battery’ category
may become more important in the future, and the demand for
some materials of  current interest could diminish. The poten-
tial for technological developments in the energy storage sec-
tor resembles the situation in the transportation sector (Fig. 3)
and the long-term directions of  both are hard to predict. 
MAGNET MATERIALS
The term ‘magnet materials’ presently refers largely to the
REE, specifically neodymium (Nd), praseodymium (Pr),
samarium (Sm), dysprosium (Dy), and terbium (Tb). It also
includes Co, but omits materials used in older magnet tech-
nologies such as ferrite-type magnets. Developments in per-
manent magnet technologies were slow and steady over more
than 50 years (Baker 2018). Aluminum–nickel–cobalt
(AlNiCo) magnets were first developed in the 1940s. In the
1950s, inexpensive, easy-to-process, relatively demagnetiza-
tion-resistant ferrite or ceramic magnets (e.g. BaFe12O19 and
SrFe12O19) were introduced. More powerful REE-based mag-
nets started with the development of  YCo5 magnets and later
SmCo5 and Sm2Co17 magnets then captured most of  the mar-
ket in high-performance motors. Sm2Co17 magnets were then
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Figure 4. Impact of  100% price increase in Li, Co, Mn, and Ni on the cost of  selected Li–ion battery systems (from Leader et al. 2019). 
largely replaced by Nd2Fe14B magnets, due in part to research
following the eightfold increase in Co prices caused by civil
unrest in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo (then called
Zaire) in 1978 (Baker 2018). This is a prime example of  how
material price instability can drive technology research. 
Neodymium–iron–boron (NdFeB) magnets contain
approximately 30% REE, mostly Nd and to a lesser extent Dy
(the latter is added to widen the operating temperature range),
and small concentrations of  other REE (e.g. Pr). Today, they
are highly publicized because of  their use in motors for electric
vehicles, wind turbines and a variety of  portable electronic
equipment, and are considered to have the greatest potential
market growth. Currently, REE (mainly Nd and Dy) represent
8% of  the total cost and 50% of  the raw materials cost for a
typical electric vehicle motor (Fig. 6; Hummel et al. 2017;
Delfeld 2018). According to Roskill (2018), a typical electric
vehicle now requires around 1 to 2 kg of  Nd–Pr alloy. 
Price variations of  Nd and Dy have a much higher impact
than comparable price variations of  Cu, steel, or Al, and will
affect the total cost of  a typical electric vehicle motor module
(Fig. 6; Hummel et al. 2017). If  we assume that the price of  an
electric motor used in the Chevrolet Bolt vehicles produced in
2017 was U.S. $1375 (middle of  the range estimate provided in
Fig. 6), the price of  Nd and Dy raw materials would have been
approximately U.S. $110, or about 8%. If  the cost of  Nd and
Dy doubles, the total price of  the motor would increase from
U.S. $1375 to U.S. $1595. The REE would then account for
13.8% of  the electric motor costs for the vehicle.
In 2018 and 2019, approximately 30% of  the world’s wind
turbines relied on direct drive NdFeB magnet-based technolo-
gy. The construction of  these turbines accounted for 8–9% of
estimated global NdFeB magnet production. In the future,
proposed offshore wind farms are expected to compete head-
on against the growing demand for NdFeB magnets for use in
electric vehicles (Roskill 2019). To achieve the U.S. Depart-
ment of  Energy’s objective of  generating 86 GW of  electric
power from U.S. offshore wind farms by 2050, approximately
15,500 tonnes of  Nd would be required. If  the average Nd
requirement for an electric vehicle motor is conservatively
assumed to be 0.75 kg per vehicle, the amount needed for off-
shore wind energy purposes equates to nearly 21 million
hybrid or electric vehicles (Fishman and Graedel 2019). 
For these reasons, and because of  perceived risks in global
REE supply, research is seeking substitutes for NdFeB mag-
nets (Widmer et al. 2015; Pavel et al. 2017a, b) and methods to
recycle REE from waste (Schulze and Buchert 2016; Auerbach
et al. 2019; Swain and Mishra 2019). If  the REE cannot be
eliminated, the REE content of  magnets could also be reduced
through better design and use of  nanocomposites (Geuss
2018). Over the past decade, lots of  research was directed
towards improving the microstructure and physical properties
of  non-REE-based permanent magnets. Those with the best
potential for replacing REE-based permanent magnets (or at
least filling the gap between ferrite and REE-based magnets)
were covered in detail by Cui et al. (2018). These details are
well beyond the scope of  this paper; however, as is the case for
the battery industry, future technological innovations leading
to commercialization results of  this research could significant-
ly alter the market conditions for materials currently belonging
to this category.
Selecting the best choice among permanent magnet tech-
nologies is not straightforward if  costs, performance, energy
use, environmental impact and other aspects are all taken into
consideration (Grunditz et al. 2018). The SmCo-type magnets
are weaker and more costly (at current prices) than their
NdFeB counterparts, but they can operate at higher tempera-
tures than NdFeB magnets. Despite their shortcomings,
unheralded old-technology ferrite magnets still account for the
largest portion of  the permanent magnet market by volume.
Permanent magnets are also not an absolute requirement for
electric vehicles, as some use so-called induction motors. The
latter rely on current flowing through the stator windings to
induce a magnetic field, and thus require no permanent mag-
nets. However, motors using permanent magnets are lighter
and smaller than induction motors and provide faster acceler-
ation and longer driving ranges. Tesla, a premium North
American electric car manufacturer, employs both permanent
magnets and induction motors. In the past, its Model S and
Model X vehicles used induction motors, whereas its Model 3
motor relied on permanent magnets (Geuss 2018). However,
since 2019, all three Tesla models use motors with permanent
magnets rather than induction motors to increase their range
and performance.
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Figure 5. Expected growth in the total U.S. energy storage capacity in gigawatt-
hours according to Chediak (2018). Values are forecasts from 2018 onwards. 
Figure 6. Cost breakdown of  an electric motor for an electric vehicle; specifically,
a Chevrolet Bolt E-Motor. Cost of  motor reported to be U.S. $1200–1550. Source:
Hummel et al. (2017). Note that values in left pie chart do not sum to 100% likely
due to rounding. 
PHOTOVOLTAIC MATERIALS
Theoretically, solar energy could provide more than enough
energy for Earth’s population (Solar Energy Industries Associ-
ation 2018). Recent improvements in photovoltaic (PV) tech-
nology have reduced the cost of  solar energy relative to tradi-
tional energy sources. The power capacity of  installed PV pan-
els in the U.S. reached 60 GW in 2018, and it is expected to
double by 2023. China’s total PV capacity recently increased by
60 GW in only one year (Solar Energy Industries Association
2018), and the cumulative global capacity of  photovoltaic
installations reached an energy generating capacity of  518 GW
in 2018 (Heath et al. 2020). Thus, photovoltaic technology is a
major contributor to efforts to combat climate change through
green energy, and materials used in these applications are
attracting wide interest.
Before the early 1970s oil crisis, most of  the efforts to
recover energy from solar radiation were focussed on aero-
space applications (Braga et al. 2008). The oil crisis first ignited
interest in the terrestrial application of  photovoltaic technolo-
gy. Silicon-based and ‘thin-film’ photovoltaic technologies are
described separately below, but both are expected to remain
important in the quest to optimize efficiency in converting
solar energy into electricity. Ultimately, both technologies may
be combined in the production of  highly efficient multi-junc-
tion cells. However, currently this gain in efficiency is counter-
balanced by a significant increase in manufacturing complexity
and production cost. 
Silicon-based Photovoltaic Technology
Until 1996, production of  silicon-based photovoltaic (PV)
technology was focused on panels using monocrystalline sili-
con (where the crystal lattice of  a given photovoltaic cell is
continuous, unbroken, and free of  grain junctions and bound-
aries). Since then, there has been a shift to so-called ‘polycrys-
talline panels’ (where individual cells consist of  multiple small
crystals or grains of  silicon in contact with each other and hav-
ing varied crystallographic orientations). Both types are silicon-
based, and raw materials used in their production until around
1997 largely came from rejects provided by the microelectron-
ics industry (Braga et al. 2008). Today, most commercial PV
modules based on first-generation silicon wafer technology
convert 17% of  incoming solar energy into electricity (Green
et al. 2015; Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems
2020). The theoretical efficiency of  a crystalline silicon solar
cell is around 29% (Richter et al. 2013), and efficiencies
approaching these limits are reported for prototype designs
(Oberbeck et al. 2020). 
The raw materials used to produce metallurgical grade and
chemical grade silicon metal are readily available, but these
cannot be used directly in the production of  solar grade silicon
because of  impurities or unfavourable physical properties. Sil-
ica raw material generally contains less than 99.8% SiO2 and
must be upgraded. The transformation involves carbothermic
reduction (Xakalashe and Tangstad 2011; Maldonado 2020)
followed by chemical or metallurgical processing to yield sili-
con metal at ≥ 99.9999% Si. The latter has a price of  U.S.
$10/kg or more, compared to less than 5 cents/kg for raw sil-
ica. Processing is energy-intensive and without government
interventions, solar grade silicon prices would likely be U.S.
$70/kg (Louwen et al. 2016; Chigondo 2018). There is much
ongoing research to find lower-cost methods to produce solar-
grade silicon (e.g. Marchal et al. 2015; Darghouth et al. 2021;
Nagahata et al. 2021). 
Thin-film Photovoltaic Technology
The relatively high prices of  crystalline silicon also motivated
research into ‘thin-film-technology’ solar cells that require one
or more specialty metals. These are widely regarded as having
a promising role in future PV technology.
These thin-film PV cells commonly involve cadmium–tel-
lurium (CdTe), copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS), or
other materials such as zinc oxide (ZnO) and cadmium–sul-
phur (CdS). Since about 2010, the conversion efficiency of
these thin-film modules has increased significantly (Green et
al. 2015; Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems 2020).
For example, the conversion efficiency of  CdTe modules has
increased from 9% to 19% since 2010. The future of  the pho-
tovoltaic industry appears bright because modern high con-
centration multi-junction thin-film photovoltaic cells achieve
conversion efficiencies of  up to 47.1% in laboratory tests
(Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems 2020). This is
considerably above the theoretical limits for silicon-based PV
cells.
Many of  the raw materials involved in thin-film PV tech-
nology are largely co-products of  base metal smelting, so they
are not ideal primary exploration targets. Many believe that
material shortages or potential future supply disruptions could
slow down commercialization of  new technologies for energy
production, and the availability of  each metal should be con-
sidered individually (Davidsson and Höök 2017; Frenzel et al.
2017; Zhou et al. 2020). 
Research in the thin-film technology domain is as intensive
(if  not more intensive) than in the field of  crystalline silicon
cells. The future of  thin-film-based panels is very promising
from a technological standpoint. However, some of  them con-
tain materials considered toxic (e.g. Cd), so questions linger
regarding environmental impacts during production and later
recycling and/or disposal. 
In summary, if  we consider that the need for renewable
energy will continue to rise rapidly and that, based on the lab-
oratory tests, the modern multi-junction photovoltaic cells can
achieve conversion efficiencies exceeding 47%, the future of
the photovoltaic industry appears bright. 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPECIALTY, BATTERY, MAG-
NET, AND PHOTOVOLTAIC MATERIALS 
Up until this point, we have presented definitions and exam-
ples of  critical, battery, magnet, photovoltaic, and specialty
materials. Some of  these materials belong to more than one of
these five material categories; the complex relationship
between these categories is depicted in Figure 7 and it shows
many overlaps. For example, Co belongs to all categories
except for photovoltaic materials. Cobalt can be promoted as
a critical battery and/or magnet material depending on the
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available fundraising opportunities, or the availability of  gov-
ernment stimuli. In contrast, barite only belongs in the wider
critical materials category, so promotional opportunities for
barite are far more limited. Figure 7 also shows that many crit-
ical materials fit into the specialty materials category. Projects
that target critical specialty materials are severely constrained
by the limited market base. As discussed earlier in the paper,
such projects are unlikely to benefit from the economy of  scale
that commonly applies to the production of  major commodi-
ties. In the final section of  the paper, we examine some of  the
specific challenges and problems that must be considered in
the assessment of  projects targeting critical specialty materials.
        
FUTURE EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
SPECIALTY MATERIALS 
The Distinction Between Market Base and Market
Projections
Larger exploration companies and vertically integrated mining
companies have the luxury to consider medium- and long-
term investments, but many junior mining and exploration
companies are more concerned with short-term survival.
Regardless of  the company’s size and financial situation, the
market base (i.e. tonnes of  material used per year) must be
reflected in the design of  exploration programs, and in the
selection of  a viable target. For example, in the short-term,
compensating for low-grade ore in a specialty material(s)
deposit by attempting to define much larger reserves is proba-
bly not a viable strategy because the current market base can-
not support a large operation with a high production rate.
However, if  projections of  the future demand for the material
are enticing, lower grade–higher tonnage deposits may be
appropriate targets for long-term development planning. This
would be particularly true for an established specialty material
producer with an existing market share. 
Assessing Long-term Projections in Relative and
Absolute Terms
In the long term, the markets for battery, magnet, and photo-
voltaic specialty materials are expected to grow at much faster
rates than markets for typical industrial metals, such as Al and
Cu. We are all bombarded by market projections and develop-
ment proposals for battery, magnet, and photovoltaic materi-
als, but most of  the better studies are proprietary in nature. For
the purpose of  this paper, we use projections from the World
Bank Group study authored by Hund et al. (2020). These pro-
jections predict the potential magnitude of  the energy material
requirements for the year 2050, assuming the “2-degree sce-
nario” from the International Energy Agency (2017) report on
energy technology perspectives. This scenario is considered to
have at least a 50% chance of  limiting the average global tem-
perature increase to 2°C by the year 2100. The market growth
projections for 17 materials considered in this scenario can be
presented in two contrasting ways (Fig. 8a, b). Essentially,
materials historically targeted by exploration companies
because of  their significant market base, such as Mn, Cu, Zn,
Al, Mo, Pb, and Ni, are forecast to benefit from modest
growth. This contrasts with the predictions for other materials
belonging to the specialty material category, which are expect-
ed to benefit from spectacular growth. For example, Li, Co,
and In have 2050 annual demand forecasts for energy tech-
nologies that are at least double their total production estimat-
ed for 2018 (Fig. 8a; Table 2). 
Any promoter trying to raise money for critical materials,
battery materials, or photovoltaic materials exploration proj-
ects will be thrilled by the approach used in Figure 8a, because
the projected 2050 market for graphite, Li, Co, In, V, Ni and
Nd appears spectacular relative to the corresponding 2018
global productions. Such long-term market growth projec-
tions, presented alone, or briefly as presentation slides, could
impress explorationists, investors and developers, and might
alarm politicians and end-users of  such critical materials. How-
ever, if  the same data are presented in a more traditional way,
i.e. in terms of  absolute yearly consumption (Fig. 8b), investor
enthusiasm might subside, as the projected energy industry
consumption (tonnage/year) for most materials with substan-
tial market bases (e.g. Al, Cu, Zn, and Mn) is relatively unap-
pealing, and usage projections for specialty materials (e.g. Ti,
Nd, V, Li, and Co.) appear small in absolute terms. The only
material that stands out regardless of  the way in which the data
are presented is graphite, although the projections for Ni also
indicate significant market growth. The most balanced view of
these long-term projections is achieved if  both approaches
(Fig. 8a, b) are presented simultaneously to allow comparison.
The Accuracy of Market Projections
Market projections are available for most specialty materials,
but such projections have often proved inaccurate. For exam-
ple, a projection for 2014, made in 2010, estimated a total
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Figure 7. Examples of  overlapping material categories. Terms ‘battery’, ‘magnet’,
and ‘photovoltaics’ are used here in sensu lato (as used by industrial users, exploration
companies, banks, and government organizations). For example, cobalt (Co) is cur-
rently considered as one of  the specialty materials but may be referred to as a ‘crit-
ical’, ‘battery’, or ‘magnet’ metal. 
demand of  197,000 tonnes/year for Rare Earth Oxides (REO)
(Watts 2010) and even higher estimates were given by several
renowned mineral economists. However, in 2018 the REO
demand was still only 190,000 tonnes/year (Gambogi 2020).
Only in 2019 did market growth exceed the 2014 projection
made by Watts (2010), and 2019 production was estimated at
220,000 tonnes/year (Gambogi 2021a). The accuracy of  the
current market projections will probably be much better than
that of  historical projections. This is largely because govern-
ment stimuli, if  and when enacted, will support the develop-
ment of  dependent technologies and supply chains, which will
provide a greater sense of  security for potential explorationists
and developers. 
Direct Impact of Market Base on the Design of
Exploration Programs
Some specialty metals (e.g. REE, Nb, Ta and Li), are common-
ly considered to be primary exploration targets. Projects target-
ing these materials should be compared and ranked in the early
stages because only a small fraction of  projects that seem to
satisfy development requirements will actually achieve produc-
tion. Projects may meet most requirements related to mining,
metallurgy, infrastructure, and societal license, but they are
unlikely to be economically viable under open-market condi-
tions if  the market base is small.
Several specialty metals projects were explored for many
years before the mineralogical and metallurgical constraints on
development were fully appreciated. It is economically difficult
for specialty metal operations to justify the development and
use of  complex custom-designed metallurgical circuits instead
of  established systems that are commercially available. Thus,
REE-bearing ionic clays, REE-fluorocarbonates, and REE-
phosphates will continue to be favoured as REE ore minerals
because commercial metallurgical circuits for them already
exist (Mariano and Mariano 2012; Simandl 2014). This is not
the case for unusual minerals such as REE-bearing silicates,
which are present in many such exploration projects, including
some that are enriched in more desirable heavy REE. Essen-
tially, high-grade, metallurgically simple, near-surface deposits
will be favoured because of  the lower associated development
and mining costs relative to larger deeply buried, metallurgical-
ly complex, or lower-grade deposits. The costs to bring large
tonnage, low-grade deposits into production cannot be justi-
fied for materials with a small market base, and high research
and development costs to tackle metallurgical complexities are
difficult to justify for small operations.
The limited market base for specialty materials restricts the
short-term interest of  major mining companies in these com-
modities. However, there are some exceptions. Most of  them
are related to potential by-products that can be recovered in
smelting. For example, Ge, In, and Cd are recovered at Teck
Resources’ integrated Zn and Pb smelting and refining com-
plex in Trail, British Columbia, as by-products. In 2021, the
Rio Tinto Fer et Titan (RTFT) complex in Sorel (Quebec)
started operating a small plant aiming to produce 20% of  the
global demand for scandium (Sc) oxide, which is presently
approximately 15 tonnes/year. This initiative was supported
with financial contribution from the Quebec government.
Other large companies are aware of  upcoming opportunities,
and many may pre-emptively attempt to establish themselves
in promising specialty materials markets.
Some major companies are now showing long-term inter-
est in materials that currently have a modest market base but
have relatively well-constrained market projections ‒ for
instance, Li. Regardless of  which battery technologies eventu-
ally dominate the electric automotive industry, Li demand is
expected to grow substantially over the next few decades.
However, as with most specialty metals, early screening of  the
project is necessary to determine if  it really has a future. Lithi-
um projects currently in production or reaching an advanced
stage of  exploration or development can be subdivided into 3
main categories: (1) evaporite/brine derived; (2) hard-rock
pegmatite deposits consisting predominantly of  spodumene
(LiAlSi2O6); and (3) unconventional sources such as jadarite
[(LiNaSiB3O7(OH)] and related Li- and B-bearing clays (Kesler
et al. 2012; Evans 2014). Possible development of  jadarite
deposits in the Jadar Basin of  Serbia is currently being investi-
gated by Rio Tinto as a source of  both Li and B (Gourcerol et
GEOSCIENCE CANADA Volume 48 2021 87
https://doi.org/10.12789/geocanj.2021.48.174
Figure 8. Expected material demands based on projections for ten energy tech-
nologies in 2050, assuming a 2 degrees scenario as defined in the International
Energy Agency (2017) report; a) shown as a percentage of  2018 global production;
b) shown in millions of  tonnes. The 2018 global production data is from USGS
Mineral Commodity Summaries (U.S. Geological Survey 2021). Figure modified
from Hund et al. (2020).
al. 2019), and if  successful, could significantly impact the glob-
al Li market. 
Industry’s Ability to Ensure Availability of Critical
Materials
Great progress is being made in developing exploration mod-
els and in customizing existing exploration methods for the
discovery and development of  most of  the critical materials
listed in Tables 1 and 2, including those associated with batter-
ies, magnets, and photovoltaic technologies. Traditional geo-
chemical and geophysical surveys, as well as remote sensing
methods used for other target types, can be applied in the
exploration for most primary critical materials. However, these
well-established methods must be modified and their applica-
tions customized to maximize their effectiveness. Detailed dis-
cussion covering new developments in exploration methods
for individual critical materials is outside the scope of  this
paper, but progress in exploration methods specific for car-
bonatite-related deposits (including critical materials such as
REE, Nb, and fluorite) illustrate some of  the trends (Simandl
and Paradis 2018). 
Similar efforts are also taking place to develop methods for
the extraction of  complex, difficult to decompose minerals.
For instance, examples of  numerous flow sheets for REE
projects are tabulated in Verbaan et al. (2015). Most of  REE
are currently derived from REE-bearing fluorocarbonates (e.g.
bastnaesite and synchysite) and REE-bearing phosphates (e.g.
monazite and xenotime); however, these minerals contain
dominantly light REE. Most heavy REE are obtained from
ion-adsorption clay deposits and this is expected to continue in
the near future (Simandl 2014; Borst et al. 2020). The ability to
extract REE from complex zirconosilicates (e.g. eudialyte) and
other heavy REE-enriched minerals commercially at competi-
tive cost would be a major breakthrough. It could permit pro-
duction of  heavy REE from large deposits hosted by alkaline
intrusions whose development is presently impeded by metal-
lurgical challenges. 
Some specialty material(s) are present in high concentra-
tions in small and/or uncommon deposits. For example, Ge is
enriched in Kipushi-type polymetallic deposits in the Demo-
cratic Republic of  Congo (Höll et al. 2007) and In-bearing
polymetallic veins exist at the Akenobe deposit in Japan
(Schwarz-Schampera 2014). However, exploration for such
‘unusual’ deposits as the primary target is not recommended if
these metals can instead be recovered as by-products of  other
metal extraction operations. For example, Ga, Ge, and In are
all by-products of  Zn smelting (Schwarz-Schampera 2014; Par-
adis 2015), and rhenium (Re) is recovered from molybdenite
concentrates produced from porphyry Cu–Mo type deposits
(Millensifer et al. 2014). Cobalt has diverse associations as a co-
product from the Katanga Copperbelt Cu ores (central Africa)
and is present in many magmatic Ni and Cu deposits, and in
Ni–Co laterites (Roberts and Gunn 2014). 
Current Cu, Pb, Zn, and Ni mines and waste piles from his-
torical operations may contain significant resources of  these
metals. Analyzing and evaluating these potential sources of
critical materials is recommended over any attempt to generate
material-specific exploration projects. Should shortages of
these by-product specialty metals develop, adding appropriate
extraction circuits to operating smelters that currently do not
recover these elements may be the most straightforward solu-
tion, assuming that suitable economics and grades prevail.
Higher-than-normal concentrations of  a desired specialty
metal (e.g. Ge in a Zn deposit) may also positively affect the
development potential of  such a deposit by subsidizing the
production of  its primary commodity.
SYNOPSIS 
Projects involving ‘battery’, ‘magnet’, photovoltaic, and/or
‘critical’ materials currently have favourable public, govern-
ment, and shareholder perceptions that make them easier to
promote than projects aimed at more traditional major com-
modities. They are commonly seen as essential in the quest for
a future carbon-neutral society. However, the assessment of
projects involving specialty materials is far more complex and
uncertain than the evaluation of  projects involving major com-
modities that exploration and mining industries are accus-
tomed to. 
The influence of  the market base is the most important
parameter in the assessment of  specialty materials exploration
programs by industry, but it is also the most commonly over-
looked or disregarded aspect. Careful consideration of  the
market base is also crucial for informed decision-making by
government agencies seeking to support or encourage such
projects. In the case of  a given specialty material, only the best
exploration and development projects will be economically
successful without government or end-user stimuli. Early rank-
ing of  projects with an emphasis on grade and tonnage,
geometallurgy, and infrastructure is recommended so that
exploration budgets can be assigned to the best projects, and
potential government stimuli responsibly allocated. In the
short term, the economy of  scale should not be expected to
play an important role in the development of  any projects tar-
geting specialty materials because of  their limited market base.
However, in the medium and long term, the concept of  econ-
omy of  scale might become applicable to some of  these proj-
ects because of  fast market growth projections for some com-
modities. The reliability and accuracy of  such growth projec-
tions are uncertain, especially in the light of  rapid technologi-
cal change. 
Clearly distinguishing between current market data, legiti-
mate market projections, and inflated expectations of  new
technologies by scientists and engineers is essential in order to
separate factual information from more speculative or promo-
tionally oriented viewpoints, and to make wise investment
decisions. There are many uncertainties to consider in the rap-
idly changing world of  modern technology. The greatest of
these are the potential impact of  future technological innova-
tions (which are virtually unpredictable), future material substi-
tutions initiated to reduce costs, and unwise assumptions
regarding the ability of  engineers to solve key technical prob-
lems that prevent commercialization of  experimental tech-
nologies. The detailed discussion of  battery, market and pho-
tovoltaic materials provides examples of  these and other
uncertainties.
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Currently, efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
direct considerable research funding towards electrification of
industries. In the short-term, specialty materials used in Nd
(Dy)FeB-type magnets are benefiting from rapid market
growth due to the increasing popularity of  electric vehicles. In
the medium- to long-term, the demand for these materials is
expected to expand beyond electric vehicles to renewable elec-
tricity generation (e.g. turbines for offshore wind farms or
tidal/wave energy). The projected demand for electric vehicles
will also benefit various materials currently required for the
production of  Li-ion type batteries. However, the driver for
market growth of  battery materials will expand to include
large-scale stationary electricity storage systems used to bal-
ance energy supply and demand, and to provide stability for
power grids. These energy storage applications do not require
batteries with a high energy density so other types of  batteries
(e.g. vanadium redox flow) may come to dominate this sector,
and these will generate different material requirements. 
It is difficult to determine which battery types will become
commercially dominant in the long-term or if  economically
viable substitutes for Nd(Dy)FeB-type magnets will be discov-
ered and commercialized. A single technological breakthrough
could abruptly change the situation in both battery and magnet
material domains and could significantly alter society’s raw
material requirements. 
The global demand for several specialty materials impor-
tant in photovoltaic applications is presently satisfied by their
recovery as by-products of  base metal or other mineral extrac-
tion. However, not all smelters have circuits in place to recover
materials currently considered as critical. If  deficiencies in sup-
plies for materials such as Ge, In, Ga, and other specialty met-
als develop, adding the appropriate circuits to existing smelting
operations may be the most effective way to meet demand. 
In the short and medium term, shortages of  battery, mag-
net, and photovoltaic raw materials due to lack of  resources
are highly unlikely. More likely causes for shortages are supply
disruptions linked to civil unrest, military conflicts, supply
chain bottlenecks, and delays in permitting future mines and
processing facilities for production. Events and uncertainties
since early 2020 also provide an illustration of  the potential for
disruptions from largely unforeseen events such as the Covid-
19 pandemic. 
CONCLUSION
In the long term, the ongoing transition from fossil fuels to
renewable (alternative) energy sources provides opportunities
and potential rewards comparable to the industrial revolution
of  1760–1840 in Europe. However, caution is required
because (at least in the short term) many critical materials are
also specialty materials, used in small quantities compared to
major industrial metals such as Fe, Cu, Al, and Zn. This aspect,
and the uncertainty related to market projections, must be con-
sidered during the planning of  exploration and development
programs, efforts to secure new supply chains, and in corpo-
rate and governmental decision-making.
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